Gendered (In)Security in South Sudan: Masculinities and Hybrid Governance in Imatong State by Oosterom, Marjoke
  
            
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Gendered (In)Security in South Sudan: Masculinities and Hybrid Governance in Imatong 
State 
 
Citation: Oosterom, M. (2017) Gendered (in)security in South Sudan: masculinities and 
hybrid governance in Imatong state, Peacebuilding 5.2: 186-202 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015  
Official url: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015  
More details/abstract: Despite the end of the civil war in 2005, many people in South Sudan 
continued to experience a deep sense of insecurity due to the many different types of violent 
conflict in the country. This sense of insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of protection from 
the state and the perceived injustice in how power is distributed at the national level. Based on 
a study carried out in 2013, prior to the country’s relapse into large-scale violence, this article 
discusses gendered insecurity and agency among the Latuko in Imatong state. In response to 
their sense of insecurity, the Latuko have developed security arrangements that represent 
forms of hybrid security governance. Using a notion of masculinity, the article will reflect on 
the gender dynamics in these local security arrangements. This shows that the social order 
that customary institutions create can contribute to an increase in violence against women at 
the domestic level. However, although women are excluded from the decision-making 
institutions that govern the security arrangements, they exercise subtle forms of agency to 
influence them. 
Version of record: © 2017 The author(s). Published by Informa UK limited, trading as Taylor 
& Francis group. This is an Open Access article  distributed under the terms of th  Creative 
Commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives license  
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and 
is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. 
 
 
 
This is a download from OpenDocs at the Institute of Development Studies     
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpcb20
Peacebuilding
ISSN: 2164-7259 (Print) 2164-7267 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpcb20
Gendered (in)security in South Sudan:
masculinities and hybrid governance in Imatong
state
Marjoke Oosterom
To cite this article: Marjoke Oosterom (2017) Gendered (in)security in South Sudan:
masculinities and hybrid governance in Imatong state, Peacebuilding, 5:2, 186-202, DOI:
10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 28 Feb 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 1090
View Crossmark data
Peacebuilding, 2017
VOl. 5, nO. 2, 186–202
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015
Gendered (in)security in South Sudan: masculinities and 
hybrid governance in Imatong state
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ABSTRACT
Despite the end of the civil war in 2005, many people in South 
Sudan continued to experience a deep sense of insecurity due to the 
many different types of violent conflict in the country. This sense of 
insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of protection from the state and 
the perceived injustice in how power is distributed at the national 
level. Based on a study carried out in 2013, prior to the country’s 
relapse into large-scale violence, this article discusses gendered 
insecurity and agency among the Latuko in Imatong state. In response 
to their sense of insecurity, the Latuko have developed security 
arrangements that represent forms of hybrid security governance. 
Using a notion of masculinity, the article will reflect on the gender 
dynamics in these local security arrangements. This shows that the 
social order that customary institutions create can contribute to an 
increase in violence against women at the domestic level. However, 
although women are excluded from the decision-making institutions 
that govern the security arrangements, they exercise subtle forms of 
agency to influence them.
Introduction
Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 ended the civil war between 
north and south Sudan, many citizens of what is now South Sudan have increasingly felt left 
behind by their government. While their people had been central to the liberation struggle, 
Equatorians feel marginalised from political power as other ethnic groups dominated both 
the transitional government (2005–10), and the government that was elected in 2010. They 
feel neglected in the allocation of resources, and deprived of state protection in a deeply inse-
cure state. After the civil war, local conflicts between groups over land and cattle, sometimes 
fuelled by the involvement of political actors at higher levels, have formed a major source 
of insecurity at the local level.1 Neither the national nor the state government have been 
able to provide adequate protection and address the deep-rooted causes of these conflicts.
1Mareike Schomerus, ‘Violent legacies: insecurity in Sudan’s central and eastern equatoria’ (Human Security baseline 
assessment (HSba) Working Paper 1, Small army Survey, geneva, 2008); and united nations development Programme, 
Community Consultation Report. Eastern Equatoria State, South Sudan. Report (Juba: South Sudan bureau for community 
Security and Small arms control, 2012).
KEYWORDS
Hybrid governance; 
citizenship; gender; 
masculinity; security; South 
Sudan
© 2017 The author(s). Published by informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & Francis group.
This is an Open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Marjoke Oosterom   m.oosterom@ids.ac.uk
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 13 december 2016 
accepted 13 February 2017
 OPEN ACCESS
PEACEBUILDING  187
This article is based on research among the Latuko, one of the Equatorian ethnic minor-
ities living in Imatong state in the Equatoria region. Imatong is one of the now 28 states of 
South Sudan.2 In response to ongoing insecurity, the Latuko use the customary institution 
of the ‘Amangat’, a village-level decision-making body of adult males, to develop security 
arrangements in response to a (potential) threat of violence, in the case of land disputes and 
attacks by cattle raiders or bandit groups. The Amangat decides protection strategies and 
mobilises the ‘Monyomiji’ (able men) to protect the area. In everyday life, the Monyomiji 
are far more effective in addressing people’s security concerns than the state. The article will 
show, however, that customary institutions like the Amangat do not necessarily produce 
optimal security outcomes for everyone. Women are excluded from the Amangat, and 
when they do not comply with the rules set by the Amangat they may experience domestic 
violence at home. However, women exercise subtle forms of agency to influence both the 
Amangat and the Monyomiji.
This article contributes to debates on hybrid security arrangements by showing how social 
practices in and around these institutions are strongly gendered, and how this affects their 
inclusiveness and legitimacy. The article uses the concept of masculinities to analyse the 
gender dynamics in the local, hybrid security governance institutions. While many studies 
on masculinities in (post)war contexts have focused on the behaviours of (ex)combatants,3 
the reproduction of masculinities by both men and women, including non-combatants, in 
everyday life has received less attention. This study shows that masculinities are reproduced 
in local institutions and everyday social practice by both genders. The civil war itself did 
not simply produce ‘militarised masculinities’. Rather, in the light of ongoing insecurity in 
South Sudan since the end of the civil war, hybrid security arrangements produce notions 
of masculinity by organising the protection roles of men. Even though women’s interests 
are rarely included in these institutions, they are deemed highly legitimate due to ongoing 
insecurity that has prompted people who are living at the margins to make their security 
arrangements.
This study was carried out before violent conflict re-erupted in December 2013, which 
started in Juba between factions in the SPLA loyal to President Salva Kiir and factions 
supporting his political rival, Riek Machar, the former vice-president. The situation rapidly 
escalated into a civil war situation in the northern states, with Machar leading a violent 
insurgency against the government. Imatong state has not been directly affected by the civil 
war violence. Nonetheless, the findings presented in this article should be read against the 
background of this highly unstable and often violent political context, which instils a deep 
sense of insecurity in the people despite the absence of civil war in their region.
The article will first discuss the recent political history of South Sudan and the events in 
Equatoria region that paved the way for its development into a type of ‘insurgent margins’. 
The subsequent sections describe the particularities of the locality where this research was 
2imatong is located in what used to be eastern equatoria State (eeS). in October 2015, President Salva Kiir issued a decree to 
create 28 states out of the existing 10 states that were constitutionally established. For a discussion of the longer history 
of debates on subdivision in South Sudan and the political significance of this administrative restructuring, see Mareike 
Schomerus and lovise aalen, Considering the State. Perspectives on South Sudan’s subdivision and federalism debate. 
Report (london: Overseas development institute, august 2016).
3Robert W. connell, ‘arms and the Man: using the new Research on Masculinity to understand Violence and Promote Peace in 
the contemporary World’, in Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence, ed. i. breines, R.W. connell and i. eide (Paris: uneScO, 
2000/2011), 21–33.
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carried out and the research methodology. The article will then discuss the hybrid security 
arrangements created by the Latuko in response to this sense of insecurity, making use of 
the existing literature on hybrid security governance, and the literature on gender and mas-
culinities in settings affected by violent conflict. The article discusses how these institutions 
function in Imatong, how they reproduce notions of masculinity and how they impact on 
gender relations. A brief reflection on the implications of the findings for peacebuilding 
precedes the conclusions.
The insurgent margins of Imatong
As Luckham and Lind (this issue) explain, the kind of places they describe as the ‘insurgent 
margins’ are contexts often marginalised from state power, while state power has a profound 
influence over local power configurations, and in the occurrence of violence, the violence 
experienced at the insurgent margins is part of a complex interplay between local struggles 
and the wider, national arena. Furthermore, these dynamics have deep historical roots in 
past patterns of violence. This certainly applies to Imatong state in the south-east of South 
Sudan, where this study was conducted.
Imatong state was important territory during both civil wars that were fought between the 
Khartoum-based Government of Sudan and the southern region, which were driven by the 
long historical marginalisation of the south and its structural exclusion from political power 
and economic resources.4 The 1951 revolt that developed into a full-fledged war (Anya Nya 
I, 1951–72) against the Khartoum Government started among soldiers based in Torit town.5 
During the second civil war (Anya Nya II, 1983–2005), the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), led by Dr. John Garang de Mabior, was based in the Equatoria region.
The SPLA was predominantly made up of men belonging to the Dinka and Nuer ethnic 
groups, which led to various tensions between the SPLA and Equatorian communities, 
which viewed the SPLA as a ‘vehicle of Dinka domination’ and experienced mistreatment.6 
Tensions between Dinka and Nuer factions within the SPLA escalated into large-scale 
violence in 1991, and spread to violent clashes between Nuer and Dinka communities.7 
One of its consequences was the displacement of thousands of predominantly Dinka into 
Equatoria region. Their presence sparked land disputes during and after the civil war, as 
part of the wider dynamics between the Dinka and Equatorian ethnic groups.
Throughout the second civil war local militias emerged across South Sudan, or split off 
from the SPLA. One of the stronger militia groups formed in Imatong in the early 1990s: the 
Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). Like other militias, the EDF emerged in response to per-
ceived domination of ethnic Dinka in the SPLA, and to the often violent ways in which the 
SPLA sought to control and govern the civilian population.8 The EDF also wanted to protect 
the Imatong population against abuse by members of the displaced Dinka communities. It 
4adam branch and Zachariah cherian Mampilly, ‘Winning the War, but losing the Peace? The dilemma of SPlM/a civil 
administration and the Tasks ahead’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 1 (March 2005): 1–20; douglas H. 
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. african issues (Oxford: currey [u.a.], 2007); and Schomerus, ‘Violent 
legacies’.
5Schomerus, ‘Violent legacies’.
6branch and Mampilly, ‘Winning the War’, 4.
7Sharon elaine Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok. ‘gendered Violence and the Militarisation of ethnicity: a case Study from South 
Sudan’, in Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa, ed. R. Werbner (london: Zed books, 2002), 84–107.
8branch and Mampilly, ‘Winning the War’; anne Walraet, ‘governance, Violence and the Struggle for economic Regulation in 
South Sudan: The case of budi county (eastern equatoria)’, Afrika Focus 21, no. 2 (2008): 53–70.
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had 12,000 fighters at its height and developed stronger ties to Khartoum than many other 
groups.9 The EDF was incorporated into the SPLA following the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005.
The CPA in 2005 and the secession from the North in 2011 did not put an end to violent 
conflict in South Sudan.10 Different types of violent conflict kept affecting communities 
across the country. Ethnicity is not necessarily the cause of these conflicts, as many are rooted 
in the civil war, or result from the politicisation of ethnic identities. Militias and groups 
of SPLA-defectors have emerged sporadically, launching attacks against state actors and 
communities. At the time of research, a militia led by David Yau Yau in then Jonglei state 
caused significant havoc.11 Yet the challenges to North–South relations remained the focus 
of attention of politicians and international actors, at the expense of addressing divisions 
within the country,12 and widespread concerns over the domination of certain ethnic groups 
in the government and in business13 – particularly the perception of Dinka domination.14 
Power struggles within the SPLM and the country’s weak and corrupt governance structures 
only compounded the already instable situation.15 These dynamics eventually caused the 
rupture in December 2013, when a new civil war began.
As was to be expected, the people of Equatoria are among those that felt disenfranchised 
after the CPA. They feel that they have contributed to the liberation struggle, but have since 
been politically marginalised.16 Also in Imatong, various forms of violent conflict have 
affected local communities since the end of the civil war. Border conflicts over state, county 
and payam borders, cattle-raiding and disaffected youth are considered major sources of 
conflict, both between and within ethnic groups. The majority of the State’s counties are 
affected by cattle-raiding and conflicts over access to water and grazing land. There have 
not been any insurgent militia groups, but armed robbers and criminal gangs have caused 
insecurity, particularly on main roads. Although not all forms of conflict are politically moti-
vated, politics and the political economies of conflict play a strong role in many of them.17
To conclude, the development of Imatong state as insurgent margins, and the Equatoria 
region at large, has its historical roots in the civil war. The tensions between Equatorians 
9Schomerus, ‘Violent legacies’.
10Roberto belloni, ‘The birth of South Sudan and the challenges of Statebuilding’, Ethnopolitics 10, no. 3–4 (november 
2011): 411–29.
11david Yau Yau ran for a seat in the Jonglei state assembly in the 2010 elections , but lost. accusing the government of fraud, 
he started an insurgent group known that locally was referred to as the Yau Yau. alison giffen, ‘case study: South Sudan’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. alex J. bellamy and Tim dunne (Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2016), 857–875, online access doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.46.
12branch and Mampilly, ‘Winning the War’; and Mareike Schomerus and Tim allen, Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: 
Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace (london: lSe-destin, 2010).
13belloni, ‘The birth of South Sudan’; and c. Zambakari, ‘South Sudan and the nation-building Project: lessons and challenges’, 
International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 8, no. 1 (2013): 5–29.
14Schomerus and allen. Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself.
15Ǿistein H. Rolandsen and inge M. breidlid, ‘a critical analysis of cultural explanations for the Violence in Jonglei State, South 
Sudan’, Conflict Trends 201, no. 1 (2012): 49–56; alex de Waal, ‘When Kleptocracy becomes insolvent: brute causes of the 
civil War in South Sudan’, African Affairs 113, no. 452 (2014): 347–69; and lotje de Vries and Peter Hakim Justin, ‘un mode 
de gouvernement mis en échec: dynamiques de conflit au Soudan du Sud, au-delà de la crise politique et humanitaire 
[a way of governing put in check: conflict dynamics in South Sudan, about a political and humanitarian crisis]’, Politique 
africaine 135 (2014): 159–75.
16Schomerus, ‘Violent legacies’.
17See Schomerus, ‘Violent legacies’, about involvement of politicians in border disputes; and Walraet ‘governance, Violence 
and the Struggle for economic Regulation’ about links between politicians in the illegal cross-border trade in arms.
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and the SPLA and displaced Dinka communities signified how Equatorians felt they were 
being marginalised on their own territory, and a sense of political marginalisation deepened 
after the civil war. Although the new civil war did not directly affect Imatong, this article 
describes how the people in this state have always anticipated it might happen one day and 
therefore needed to be ready.
Research location and methodology
The study was conducted in Imurok payam, which is located in Torit county of Imatong 
state. Imatong state is a hill area in South Sudan’s borderlands, in the Equatoria region in 
the south-east, bordering Uganda. Torit town is the headquarters of both the county and the 
state. Imatong has 12 counties in total, which are divided into administrative units called 
payams (districts), and these are sub-divided into bomas (clusters of villages). Equatoria 
region is home to approximately nine ethnic groups. All are ethnic minorities – the Dinka 
are a majority nationally but a minority in this region – and many of these groups have a 
pastoralist lifestyle. This study was carried out in Imurok payam, a two-hour drive from Torit 
town. Going further south one arrives in Magwi county, which borders Uganda. Imurok was 
selected because it has a number of unresolved border issues and the presence of customary 
institutions known for their involvement in local security arrangements. At the same time, 
Imurok was also relatively stable enough for fieldwork to be carried out safely. Imurok payam 
is populated by the agro-pastoralist Latuko. Little has been documented about the Latuko 
in academic literature, with the work of S. Simonse on the Latuko customary institutions 
being the only point of reference for this study.18
A mud-brick building in one of the bomas held a small office for the payam adminis-
trator: the appointed local official, who in this case was a resident from the payam. The 
payam administrator is the main channel of communication to the county government and 
the single embodiment of state presence in the payam. For the remote parts of the payam, 
finding the administrator requires a three-to-four-hour walk. In the past, two NGOs had 
visited the payam to take stock of any community conflict and discussed the border disputes 
in all-community meetings, emphasising the importance of inter-community dialogue, but 
without concrete follow-up on the issues.
Various qualitative research methods were used in this study, enabling triangulation. At 
payam level 20 focus group discussions were conducted, with equal numbers for men and 
women. Groups used participatory methods to analyses the forms of insecurity and violence 
in the payam and Imurok state, their causes and consequences.19 Topic guides were used 
to facilitate discussions about agency in response to insecurity. In addition, 18 individual 
interviews were carried out with customary leaders and local state officials about their roles. 
A Photo Voice exercise with six men and six women (including two seventeen year-olds) 
focused on individual perceptions on the causes of insecurity, and individual responses.20 
18Simonse, ‘The Monyomiji age-class Systems of the Southern Sudan’, Nilo-Ethiopian Studies Newsletter (Kyoto) no. 1 (1993): 
6–11.
19adapted from caroline O.n. Moser and Peter Horn, ‘understanding the Tipping Point of urban conflict: conceptual 
Framework Paper’ (university of Manchester: urban Tipping Point (uTP) Project, 2011).
20caroline c. Wang, ‘Photovoice: a Participatory action Research Strategy applied to Women’s Health’, Journal of Women’s 
Health 8, no. 2 (1999): 185–92; and esther Prins, ‘Participatory Photography: a Tool for empowerment or Surveillance?’ 
Action Research 8, no. 4 (december 1, 2010): 426–43.
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All pictures were printed and returned to participants, after which follow-up interviews 
were conducted, and two group discussions, again with men and women separately.
Hybrid governance institutions in Imurok
As Luckham and Lind (this issue) explained, the state may be little present in the insurgent 
margins, while non-state institutions may offer basic governance and security. Among the 
Latuko, a number of customary institutions exist that are part of the hybrid governance 
set-up. Hybridity denotes ‘the multiple sites of political authority and governance where 
security is enacted and negotiated’.21 It entails the many ways in which traditional, kin-based 
or clientelistic practices interact with modern, imported, or rational actor-based practices,22 
thus producing a new governance reality consisting of a hybrid practice. Hybridity means 
that a continuous negotiation between local state and customary institutions takes place, 
often around very concrete and local issues, thus producing ‘negotiated statehood’ in the 
words of Hagmann and Péclard. Customary and local state institutions may compete as 
much as they collaborate,23 as is also noted for South Sudan.24
This section will explain how the hybrid governance institutions in Imurok work by 
making use of the concept of masculinities. Masculinities can be defined as the stereotypes, 
behavioural norms, expectations and rules assigned to men25; the set of traits or patterns 
of behaviour that are considered ‘typical’ of men.26 These norms thus tend to represent a 
presumed essence of manhood. Expressed in plural, the concept of masculinities under-
lines that a variety of such behavioural norms and rules exist within every given context.27 
Masculinities are socially constructed and as such they are not ‘fixed’, but can change over 
time.
The concept of masculinities has been used to analyse how gender relations are reconfig-
ured during and after conflict. War and violent conflict are often associated with producing 
‘militarised masculinities’, with men represented as fighters and the protectors of women 
and children and embodying aggression when they return home.28 However, ‘militarised 
masculinities’ are not simply reproduced by the behaviours of ex-combatant males. Notions 
of masculinity are negotiated and reproduced in everyday institutions and social interac-
tions, by both men and women,29 including children.30 Furthermore, masculinities need 
21niagale bagayoko, eboe Hutchful, and Robin luckham, ‘Hybrid Security governance in africa: Rethinking the Foundations 
of Security, Justice and legitimate Public authority’, Conflict, Security & Development 16, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 6.
22ibid.
23Hagmann, Tobias, and didier Péclard, ‘negotiating Statehood: dynamics of Power and domination in africa: negotiating 
Statehood’, Development and Change 41, no. 4 (august 16, 2010): 539–62.
24bagayoko et al., ‘Hybrid Security governance in africa’; and christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus, and lotje de Vries, 
eds. The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, Palgrave 
Series in african borderlands Studies (new York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
25laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, eds. Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives (Santa barbara, ca: Praeger, Praeger 
Security international, 2010), 4.
26Md. Mozammel Haque, ‘Hope for gender equality? a Pattern of Post-conflict Transition in Masculinity’, Gender, Technology 
and Development 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 55–77.
27Jerker edström, abhijit das, and chris dolan, ‘introduction: undressing Patriarchy and Masculinities to Re-Politicise gender’, 
IDS Bulletin 45, no. 1 (January 2014): 1–10.
28eriksson baaz and Maria Maria Stern, ‘Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives negotiating identity among Women Soldiers 
in the congo (dRc)’, Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 4 (2013): 711–39.
29R. Morrell, ‘The Times of change: Men and Masculinity in South africa’, in Changing Men in South Africa, ed. R. Morrell 
(Pietermaritzburg: university of natal Press, 2001), 3–37.
30amina Mama, ‘Khaki in the Family: gender discourses and Militarism in nigeria’, African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (September 
1998): 1.
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not necessarily be militarised after war: in some post-war contexts the militant masculinity 
became devalued and the dominant masculinity became that of men as ‘model’ fathers and 
husbands who are responsible for the education and prosperity of their families.31
Masculinities will influence and shape the behaviours of both men and women in rela-
tion to security and violence – insofar as existing masculinities prescribe roles in relation 
to the security context. The concept of masculinities can therefore be usefully brought into 
debates about hybrid security governance, how they function and for whom. Beyond their 
functioning as governance institutions, certain customary institutions serve as places where 
norms and practices around deliberation and decision-making are learnt and transmitted 
across generations, and where authority is practised and confirmed.32 Similarly, customary 
institutions may confirm and reproduce certain notions of masculinity in their everyday 
functioning.
The Latuko have individual customary leaders as well as institutions for collective deci-
sion-making. Important are the Chiefs of the Land, the rainmakers and chiefs of the spear. 
These customary leaders are inherited positions and can be male and female. They are highly 
respected in the community and their authority increases with age and experience. All these 
customary leaders took on protective roles during the war, using their spiritual powers to 
protect the community. In the present, all act as community advisors. Chiefs of the land 
have knowledge of boundaries and territorial borders and therefore play an important role 
in land disputes. For serious border disputes between communities, the Chiefs of the Land 
from both sides of the border need to discuss a resolution. When they cannot agree, a ritual 
is performed in which a goat is slaughtered, its blood tasted by the Chiefs of the Land, and 
then both chiefs need to ‘swear’ on the border. The chief of the land who had claimed the 
land under false pretences is expected to die or fall seriously ill over the next few days. This 
ritual is therefore considered to be very serious and used as a last resort. Chiefs of the land 
can furthermore bless the land for cultivation and perform rituals to ensure good harvests. 
As their title suggests, rainmakers perform rituals to attract the rains at the right time for 
cultivation. The chiefs of the spear bless the arms of the men who go out to fight and perform 
rituals for the protection of those who fight and those who stay behind.
The institutions ‘Amangat’ and ‘Monyomiji’ have been documented by Simonse.33 The 
Amangat (village section) is the assembly of adult males and the decision-making institu-
tion at the local level. Young adult males, called Monyomiji, are organised in age cohorts. 
Monyomiji means ‘owners’ or ‘fathers’ of the land.34 They are the rulers and protectors of 
the community until they reach the age set of ‘elders’ and retire. Young men belonging to 
the same age set group ‘graduate’ to become Monyomiji at the same time (approximately 
every five years), which is when the older age set of Monyomiji retires. It is as much a social 
identity as it is an age group with certain responsibilities: they preside over the social order, 
moral integrity and security (both food security and physical security) of the community.
31Haque, ‘Hope for gender equality?’
32Stephen n. ndegwa, ‘citizenship and ethnicity: an examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics’, American 
Political Science Review 91 (1997): 599–616; ben Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda (edinburgh: edinburgh university 
Press, 2009); and Marjoke a. Oosterom, ‘The effects of Protracted conflict and displacement on citizen engagement in 
northern uganda’, Conflict, Security & Development 16, no. 1 (2016): 75–101.
33Simonse, ‘The Monyomiji age-class Systems’.
34ibid.
PEACEBUILDING  193
This study found that the Amangat stands as a symbol for unity and harmony in the 
community. The Amangat meets at the Adufa, which is a fenced meeting place where the 
drums are kept. It is a place where visitors can be received and provided with food, and huts 
built around the Adufa can accommodate visitors. Women cannot participate in the gath-
erings of the Amangat. They are not allowed to enter the Adufa and if a woman trespasses 
her whole age group will be fined. Within the Amangat a social hierarchy exists, based on 
age and level of authority, with corresponding responsibilities. The Amangat in Imurok 
included four age sets: Ahou are the most senior Monyomiji, who play an advisory role and 
give orders to the lower rank Monyomiji. They keep the fire in the Amangat. Ohiji are the 
senior Monyomiji who enforce the orders given by the Ahou. Ofirat are the middle-senior 
Monyomiji who oversee the implementation of orders by the Asahat. They are the first to be 
mobilised to defend the community. Asahat are the junior class of Monyomiji, the ‘footmen’ 
who implement any orders given to them.35 Customary leaders and elders are advisors to 
the Monyomiji in the Amangat.
At the time of research, many Monyomiji gather every evening in the Amangat to dis-
cuss the day, and periodically all members of the Amangat come together to deliberate on 
community affairs. The Amangat discusses, takes decisions about celebrations, cultivation, 
initiations and communal labour (on roads or schools) The Amangat can decide to put 
requests to the payam authorities, for example, when the local health unit runs out of drugs. 
Payam authorities, in turn, consult the Amangat about community needs. The security of 
the payam is a main concern of the Amangat. In the case of an acute emergency or security 
threat, the drums in the Adufa will be beaten and the Monyomiji will gather in the Amangat 
to decide on their strategy. The decision on whether ‘to talk peace or to declare war’ is taken 
here. In Amangat meetings the day-to-day security of the payam is discussed, varying from 
any incident of ‘two brothers arguing among themselves’ to possible tensions with other 
communities. Monyomiji will report the news from other places and on anything unusual 
observed on their territory.
The Amangat is a site for preparing youth for adulthood and for becoming active mem-
bers of their community. In order to become Monyomiji, a young man needs apply to the 
Amangat and pay a contribution to its members. In the case of Imurok, the contribution 
consisted of 18 sticks of bamboo and a goat. Failing to do so ‘a youth will not have voice in 
the community and will be regarded as a woman’, one man stated in a focus group, under-
lining that the public sphere for deliberation and decision-making is the domain of men. All 
men highlighted the Amangat as the place where the youth are ‘taught’ norms and values, 
and the culture and history of the Latuko. They are given advice on how to live in harmony, 
on how to protect the women in case of any external threat or attack. If a Monyomiji is not 
following the rules, then the senior Monyomiji will intervene and his entire age cohort may 
be fined. Monyomiji can temporarily be suspended from the Amangat and disciplined and 
advised by the elders.
Older men indicated that this function of the Amangat had been disrupted during the 
war. The Amangat had barely functioned as people were dispersed and many men partici-
pated in the SPLA. One of the local boma chiefs explains:
35Our latuko interpreters indicated that the social hierarchy within the Amangat exists in all latuka areas , but the titles of 
each age group can vary from place to place, but that.
194   M. OOSTEROM
The Monyomiji were powerless at that time. They could only send people to fight in the SPLA 
and follow the orders of those in command. Some stayed behind to protect the area, but they 
had no weapons. So they protected only with words [spells]. They would accompany the women 
and show them where to hide. Whenever the SPLA came into their area they would say: ‘We 
are just here with the women to cultivate. We have already sent our children to fight. We have 
nothing, we are just farming’. All the Monyomiji did was to pick up and carry the small children 
that were left behind when the women had to run [to hide].
In this interview and other discussions, it appeared that the men’s role as fighters in the 
SPLA had been in tension with losing the institutions of the Amangat and the codes among 
the Monyomiji that govern how fighting is done. They also stressed that as many young men 
were conscripted into either the SPLA or the SAF, they missed formal education and ‘the 
education at home’ – meaning participation in the customary institution of the Amangat 
where one learns to become a man. Some elders expressed their concerns over the Monyomiji 
who nowadays choose to fight where other resolutions are possible, which they view as one 
of the causes for conflict in Imatong state.
Aside from the Monyomiji masculinity being reproduced in the Amangat, it is constructed 
in other social practices, like in social gatherings that bring age cohorts together. Alcohol 
consumption is an important part of that, for instance after a day of group cultivation. The 
men emphasised that drinking is again a social activity that supports togetherness among 
men, like during the war when it had been a reward for the hardship they endured as sol-
diers. They felt that peer pressure among Monyomiji encouraged them to drink, especially 
among those within the same age group. They also recognised the many problems caused 
by drinking, including wife battering and physical fights among men.
In terms of local state authorities, various forms of collaboration exist between the payam 
administration, the Monyomiji and customary leaders. This is possibly enabled by the fact 
that several customary leaders in Imurok double as local government chiefs. For instance, 
the head chief of the payam was one of the important Chiefs of the Land and some of the 
boma chiefs are respected elders. The men state that the payam authorities often consult 
the Amangat and that, when a problem or dispute is reported to the payam administrator, 
he will involve a number of Monyomiji to discuss the issue.
Local state actors like the payam administration have blended in with the customary 
institutions when minor issues need to be resolved. For example, physical fights among 
men were usually stopped and settled among the Monyomiji themselves, who would ‘put 
the culprits down to advise them’. A group of Monyomiji with involvement from older age 
groups and sometimes the elders would tackle this. It is accepted among the Monyomiji 
that the payam administrator has to intervene if a fight results in serious injuries. The pre-
ferred solution was to resolve the dispute internally and not to involve the police because 
this could threaten community unity. Mindful of this, the payam administrator would try 
to settle the issue locally with some of the elders involved.
Gendered experiences of insecurity among the Latuko
The findings showed clear differences between men and women and the forms of violence 
and insecurity that affect them. In ranking exercises, women prioritised a wide range of 
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forms of violence with physical violence against women in the community and domestic 
violence ranked the highest by far. They also listed girl-child compensation,36 sexual violence 
and rape, early marriage, no education for girls, widow inheritance and the effects of polyg-
amy. Women identified cattle raiding and land disputes as major public security concerns, 
although Imurok has rarely experienced attacks by raiders. Men ranked the presence of land 
mines, which limits opportunities for cultivation, and effects of alcohol highest. Men pri-
oritised ‘fights within the community’ next, which caused disunity and could subsequently 
weaken collective capacities to take care of food security and protect the community. ‘Wife 
battering’ only followed after this.
In the Photo Voice exercise, all six women included pictures representing domestic 
violence. Their pictures of livestock referred to cattle raiding, and pictures of bushy areas 
reflected their fear of unpredictable attacks of raiders and militias. Men took pictures 
that reflected their concerns about cattle raids and border disputes. Even if a raid has not 
taken place in the payam itself, raiders moving through the payam can be a risk. One man 
explained: ‘If the raiders hide themselves and the cattle on our territory, others may think 
we support them. This may lead to retaliation by those who were affected’. He referred to an 
incident in 2011, when county security forces retrieved six hundred head of cattle from a 
criminal gang that had come to hide in Imurok.37 Men were not as concerned about militias 
as the women. Often better informed about events in the country, they currently did not 
feel under threat of any militia group.
From focus group discussions as well as Photo Voice pictures it became clear that deeper 
concerns underpinned the sense of insecurity among the Latuko, which reflect their experi-
ence of living in the insurgent margins. Both men and women agreed that the imbalance in 
the distribution of power at the top of the government was the root cause of most conflicts 
in South Sudan. In pictures, this was represented as the shattered flag of the new nation, a 
crack in the wall of the payam administration office. One man said:
Of course poverty is a cause [of violence]; it makes people go steal and carry out raids, which 
may lead to revenge by those other communities. But power struggles at the top and tribal 
politics is the major cause of conflict. That is why violence persists. In the government, only 
a few tribes occupy the important government positions. Such people often have direct influ-
ence on the distribution of services to communities. Those people who lack representation 
[in the government] often lag behind in terms of employment, because they have no schools 
and remain uneducated.38
This study also encountered the frustration among the Latuko about their contribution 
to the war that is not acknowledged or rewarded, and their sense of living on the margins 
of the state. An older man, who fought in both the first and second civil war, explains:
… we [Equatorians] have fought for other people. During the war I was convinced that when 
we achieve our goal that there would be equal development. But to my surprise things are 
moving in a different direction. We are not equal because others claim that they were ‘born 
to rule’. Who is born to be ruled? The Dinkas are not good people and [are] responsible for 
our suffering. They have created income inequality, they enjoy life while we are suffering (...) 
The majority of us who started the movement during the Torit mutiny feels we are left out. 
36girl-child compensation refers to a form of compensation after someone is killed. The family of the perpetrator has to 
compensate the family of the victim by sending them one of their daughters, often a very young girl.
37This incident was also reported on the catholic Radio network, 8 October 2011, http://catholicradionetwork.
org/?q=node/5049.
38Focus group discussion with men, imurok, 9 november 2013.
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The current government is not doing the things we want. That is why Imurok is the way it is, 
despite the fact that the liberation struggle started from our mountains.39
To both men and women, the Yau Yau rebellion40 that was ongoing in Jonglei state was a 
sign that the government was unable to address conflict in areas that were not in its interest. 
One male participant said: ‘The government is trying to resolve this. But we hear the news 
about people being killed every day on the radio. We also hear about peace talks, but the Yau 
Yau are still invading areas’.41 While the men were not as concerned as the women about 
the Yau Yau, the men recognise the volatility and unpredictability of many of the violent 
conflicts in South Sudan, which may affect the payam. This was captured by this participant:
The violence may approach as rapidly as a bushfire. That conflict of Yau Yau is politically 
motivated. We and the people of Jonglei are under the same [national] government. We are 
worried these things can happen here …42
Due to the distrust in the national state, the Latuko feel that they are largely left on their 
own to protect their communities. This came out clearly in focus groups and the Photo 
Voice exercise, in which both men and women expressed that local institutions like the 
Monyomiji are far more important for organising protection than the state. Local officials 
at the payam and boma level enjoyed some respect, mainly because they were from Imurok 
and could handle local disputes. The people had very little confidence, however, in the 
county and state government.
To conclude, this section argues that a sense of security among men and women is 
shaped by the threat of violence associated with violent conflict in other parts of Equatoria 
region and the country. The uncertainty about conflicts elsewhere is deepened by lack of 
trust in the government of South Sudan to resolve them, especially for populations that are 
marginalised from political power. The remaining sections will elaborate how the Latuko 
respond to this sense of insecurity and discuss how responses are gendered.
Security responses by the Amangat and the Monyomiji
The Latuko’s responses to their sense of insecurity are embedded in local social and political 
institutions, the Amangat and the Monyomiji, and are informed by a notion of masculinity 
that defines men as protectors. At the same time, these strategies produce a new social 
reality. Part of this reality is that certain forms of violence against women have increased, 
as this section will explain. This links to debates about the inclusiveness of hybrid govern-
ance institutions, and for whom they work. The potential exclusionary nature of non-state 
security institutions has been noted in particular for women and other vulnerable groups, 
which impacts on their everyday security.43 Meagher argues it is important to clarify to what 
extent hybrid governance institutions are locally legitimate in the eyes of the governed, and 
are accountable to them. She shows that some of them have been driven by elite interests,44 
39Payam chief of imurok payam, interview, July 31, 2013.
40See note 11 above.
41Focus group with men, imurok, august 5, 2013.
42Focus group discussion with men, imurok, november 9, 2013.
43ibid.
44Kate Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States? non-state Security actors and Hybrid governance in africa’, Development & 
Change, 43, no. 5 (September 2012): 1073–101.
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while other forms of non-state governance enjoy popular support.45 Therefore, Bagayoko 
et al. argue that research into hybrid governance institutions must ask how these institutions 
work and for whom, and critically examine their legitimacy, and furthermore look at how 
different groups exercise agency in relation to hybrid governance institutions and confer 
legitimacy to them.46
The men in Imurok payam were initially very keen to emphasise that there were no 
security issues in the area and that they were not afraid of anything. The way they spoke 
about their payam was in line with their role of protector: the area is safe under their pro-
tection. The discussions conveyed an important message: the Monyomiji are always ready 
to fight and are always vigilant. They demonstrated their vigilance in various ways, which 
were explicitly mentioned in the context of discussing insecurity caused by ‘enemies’ from 
elsewhere and not only in relation to local communities of raiders. Particular areas in the 
payam are regularly monitored to see if any intruders have entered. The junior Monyomiji are 
sent to look out for footsteps and any other traces. Each and every Monyomiji will monitor 
his surroundings whenever he is travelling, hunting or moving to his gardens. This practice 
of monitoring the area is a key responsibility of the Monyomiji and one of the practices 
that defines his social, masculine identity as Monyomiji. Each individual Monyomiji regards 
upholding these responsibilities as highly important, especially in relation to the peers in 
his age set. In the boma in the north of Imurok payam, people keep large stocks of cattle. 
Seeing this as an increased risk to raids, the Monyomiji sleep in shifts while others are on 
guard to protect the cattle and the territory.
Their responses may extend to security issues at the state and national level. At the time 
of research in November, a raid and revenge attack had just happened in Hiala payam, Torit 
county. News of it was shared in several Amangats in the payam. It was decided that no 
action needed to be taken, but that all Monyomiji had to be alert, especially in the northern 
parts. In relation to the Yau Yau rebellion, the senior Monyomiji and elders advised the 
members of the Amangat to stay united, so that they could fend off attack by these militias 
– or should other militias approach Imatong state. Across the payam, the Monyomiji had 
established that it was unlikely that Yau Yau would come as far as Imurok, and therefore 
no extra measures were taken. When news arrived that President Salva Kiir had dissolved 
the cabinet in July 2013, possible security implications were discussed in the Amangat. This 
time, the Monyomiji were more alarmed and made sure to follow the news closely, either 
over the radio or from town.
In this particular payam, local state officials all originate from Imurok and are therefore 
part of local customary institutions, since the Latuko are the only ethnic group. Their iden-
tities as state official and Latuko males intersect and, interestingly, the Latuko male identity 
might dominate in cases of acute insecurity. The men stressed that anyone who is part of 
the local government administration will have to join the defence when ‘the drum is beaten’. 
Thus, much as payam administrators and chiefs are obliged to report pending violence to 
the county government, their membership of the Monyomiji requires them to engage in 
45ibid.; lars buur, ‘The Sovereign Outsourced: local Justice and Violence in Port elizabeth’, in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, 
Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World, ed. Thomas blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Princeton, nJ: Princeton 
university Press, 2005), 192–217; and Rachel Sieder, ‘contested Sovereignties: indigenous law, Violence and State effects 
in Postwar guatemala’, Critique of Anthropology 31, no. 3 (2011): 161–84.
46bagayoko et al., ‘Hybrid Security governance’.
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non-state responses. The study did not verify whether this had occurred in the past, but 
these responses emphasise the importance of the Monyomiji in hybrid security governance.
It is concerning the protection of women that the strategies of the Monyomiji could be seen 
as detrimental to gender equality. For men, the security concerns over violent conflict elsewhere 
have become sites where particular versions of masculinity can be confirmed and reproduced, 
and the identity of the Monyomiji reasserted after having been largely dysfunctional during the 
war. On the one hand, Monyomiji will carry out genuine protection activities. They inform the 
women about any security concerns, advise them on how to behave and ask them to report 
anything or anyone unusual and unknown. When the presence of enemies is suspected they 
will accompany women to the water points and their gardens, sometimes climbing the trees to 
survey the area. On the other hand, the Amangat may impose rules that restrict the mobility of 
women. They have to be home in the afternoon, long before dark. They have to avoid certain 
places and cannot move without the permission of their husbands. Women may be punished 
when they break the rules. Yet it is impossible for women to obey them all. ‘If you need to take 
vegetables to the market and you use the road, then it is between you and God. You have to go, out 
of poverty. You cannot not go’.47 Also, women explained that they do not manage to complete all 
their tasks within these limitations. As explained above, perceived ‘negligence’ in completing 
duties easily leads to domestic violence.
A number of factors come together that shape the behaviour of the Monyomiji in relation 
to the women in the payam. First, any planning about the security of the payam is primarily 
the responsibility of the Monyomiji. Due to the existence of these forms of violence and the 
uncertainty of the context they live in, the men continue to be called upon to act in their role 
as protectors. This appeal to the Monyomiji is deepened by their perceptions of the state of 
South Sudan as being highly insecure. Secondly, many Monyomiji have – to a certain extent 
– inherited traits of militarised masculinities as part of the legacy of the war. More impor-
tantly, however, they are collectively trying to reassert their authority and the functioning 
of customary institutions like the Amangat, after these had been disrupted during the war. 
Thirdly, the Monyomiji are obliged to their peers and to the Amangat to enforce rules and 
protection mechanisms. Thus, while domestic violence and inter-community violence seem 
to be two different problems, one of the ways in which they are connected is through the 
rules and protection strategies developed through hybrid institutions.
Women’s agency in relation to hybrid security governance
This final section discusses the agency of women vis-à-vis the Amangat and Monyomiji, 
thus addressing the issue of inclusiveness and accountability of hybrid governance insti-
tutions, and the ability of relatively marginalised groups to influence them.48 It is well 
established that populations living in areas affected by violence and conflict exercise agency 
in various ways,49 but that this agency is strongly gendered.50 Discourses about women in 
47individual interview with a woman, august 5, 2013.
48bagayoko et al., ‘Hybrid Security governance’; and Meagher, ‘Strength of Weak States’.
49Shane Joshua barter, ‘unarmed Forces: civilian Strategies in Violent conflicts’, Peace & Change 37, no. 4 (2012): 544–69; 
caroline nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Mats utas, ‘West-
african Warscapes: Victimcy, girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic agency in a Young Woman’s Social navigation of the liberian 
War Zone’, Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 403–30; and Henrik Vigh, Navigating Terrains of War Youth 
and Soldiering in Guinnea-Bissau (Oxford: bergahn books, 2006).
50caroline O.n. Moser and Fiona c. clark, eds., Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence 
(london: Zed books, 2001).
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conflict zones have shifted from emphasising the victimhood of women to seeing women 
as agents, both within combatant groups and as the organisers and protectors of families 
in their homesteads, taking up new roles in the absence of men.51 It has furthermore been 
increasingly understood that violent conflict can reconfigure gender relations.52 A popular 
thought is that, while their husbands are away fighting, women gain certain freedoms by 
engaging in economic activities and taking up social leadership roles, which they would 
maintain in the post-conflict situation.53 However, in the aftermath of conflict there can be 
a push to return to ‘normality’ from various sides, from ex-combatant men but also other 
men and women, which pressures women to resume domestic roles and leave the public 
sphere, which can lead to frictions.54 In South Sudan, even female SPLA combatants were 
expected to resettle in domestic life. Shaped by their combat experience the behaviour of 
these women was considered ‘unfeminine’ in a context where women are expected to be 
docile. Even though they became part of an elite as fighters, it did not transform deep-rooted 
patriarchal institutions,55 which underlines the importance of feminities and masculinities 
in gender relations. In this study, it became clear that (non-combatant) women actively seek 
to influence hybrid governance institutions but also reproduce the masculinities within 
the Amangat.
In Imurok payam, the women are as vigilant as the men when they move through their 
area. They bring news from town when they have gone to the market, including about 
security issues, and they share information at water points and markets. Security issues in 
the county concerns them as much as issues further away:
We hear over the radio that things have happened in Jonglei [Yau Yau militia]. (…) When I 
hear news about Jonglei, I will tell my neighbour that there is no good news. It is important to 
share this, because what if my neighbours have plans to travel? Many of our men in the army 
stay in such places, but their wives should not go visit them when the situation is bad. Also, it 
is important to know this for our own security. Because if those people [Yau Yau] move this 
way, then we will have followed their movements.56
If women hear anything unusual, they will report it to the Monyomiji. As mentioned, 
women cannot formally take part in the Amangat and they are largely excluded from deci-
sion-making processes about security arrangements. In very subtle ways, they seek to influ-
ence the male-dominated institutions to enhance their personal security.
The study found that women try to address domestic violence through the Amangat, 
when Photo Voice pictures showed portraits of elderly women, who command respect for 
their seniority and experience, and the few female customary leaders like the rainmakers 
or Chiefs of the Land. They help to settle marital disputes and talking to the men who 
had beaten their wives. The homes of these women leaders can act as safe havens. ‘When 
51donna Pankhurst, ‘The “Sex War” and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist approach to Peace building’, Development in Practice 
13, no. 2–3 (May 2003): 154–77; Judy el-bushra, ‘Fused in combat: gender Relations and armed conflict’, Development 
in Practice 13, no. 2–3 (2003): 252–65; and chris coulter, ‘Female Fighters in the Sierra leone War: challenging the 
assumptions?’ Feminist Review 88 (2008): 54–73.
52Myriam denov, Girls in Fighting Forces. Moving Beyond Victimhood (Otawa, canada: cida, 2007); and Sjoberg and Via, 
eds. Gender, War, and Militarism.
53l. Handrahan, ‘conflict, gender, ethnicity and Post-conflict Reconstruction’, Security Dialogue 35, no. 4 (december 1, 2004): 
429–45.
54Pankhurst, ‘The Sex War’; and Henri Myrttinen, ‘Masculinities, Violence and Power in Timor leste’, Revue Lusotopie Xii, no. 
1–2 (2005): 233–44.
55Sjoberg and Via, eds., ‘gender, War and Militarism’; and clémence Pinaud, ‘“We are trained to be married!” elite Formation 
and ideology in the “girls’ battalion” of the Sudan People’s liberation army’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 3 
(2013): 375–93.
56Focus group with women, imurok, november 7, 2013.
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a beating is really bad, we can go to their homes, even at night. The woman leader will let 
you sleep in her hut and you are now under her responsibility. The next day she can call the 
husband to settle the issue’.57 These women leaders can act on behalf of the interests of all 
women and speak to the Amangat. A woman leader cannot enter the Adufa, but will stand 
at an appropriate distance and speak to the gathering of the Monyomiji. Or, some of the 
Monyomiji will come out of the Adufa to listen to her and subsequently convey her message. 
One of the older women in the focus groups had raised the issue of ‘taking responsibility 
for a family and staying in peace’, which send a message to the Amangat about addressing 
domestic violence.58 Also the female rainmaker and Chief of the Land had spoken to the 
Amangat, who, in their position of customary leaders, can be invited to advise the Amangat 
and may use the opportunity to raise concerns the women have. They will present it as a 
threat to the harmony of the entire community. They emphasise that disharmony can make 
the community vulnerable, thus speaking to a major concern of the Amangat.
In a similar vein, women may try to trigger and influence responses to public security 
concerns. Concerning land disputes, for instance, other than female Chiefs of the Land no 
woman is expected to participate in the resolution of land disputes because ‘women cannot 
be expected to have the historical knowledge of the borders.’59 When tensions increased in a 
border dispute with Magwi county in 2012, the women were concerned about the effects 
of (possible) violence on social relationships with Magwi communities, and about their 
mobility as they needed to be able to go to the market in Magwi town. They also need to 
use the land in the border area for cultivation. When tensions about the disputed border 
were considerably high, women refrained from going near the border. For such concerns, 
women may try to influence the Amangat. They may again send a women leader to the 
Amangat. Also wives may call upon their husbands to take issues into the Amangat on behalf 
of the women. These cannot be minor or ‘private’ issues, but issues that affect the wider 
community, and they cannot be the opinion of an individual, but it needs to be endorsed 
by a group of women. An example from one of the bomas concerned the start of the season 
for cultivation. In 2012, many of the men had been drinking before they went to the garden 
and this had led to many fights. Concerned that this would happen again this year, a group 
of women had approached one Monyomiji and asked him to raise it in the Amangat, after 
which the Amangat reinforced that drinking was an activity for after work.
Influencing may also occur very subtly in everyday interactions. During the Magwi 
border dispute, wives appealed to their husbands’ responsibility to protect, as Monyomiji, 
using the defining traits of the prevailing masculinity. The men mentioned that the women 
spoke about the consequences for their children, who might lose the land as their resource 
for production. This directly appealed to the Monyomiji’s responsibility for food security. 
Furthermore, by warning the men that ‘we [women from Imurok] will be their women’ the 
women emphasised they belong to their men, and that the men would risk losing their 
pride. While in everyday life, the fact that women are ‘owned’ after the bride price is paid 
limits their voice in the household, here women used it to prompt action. But although 
women wanted their men to act, they did not want the situation to escalate into violence. 
The women therefore emphasised that there was a lot of inter-marriage with the people 
across the border. Women live in Imurok as wives, while daughters of Imurok are married 
57ibid.
58interview with the older woman leader, november 8, 2013.
59interview, man, imurok, July 28, 2013.
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in Magwi. They stressed it would be wrong to fight with in-laws, thus appealing to some of 
the values that were recognised in the Amangat, and pointing at a peaceful resolution by 
interventions from the Chiefs of the Land.
Thus, women seek to enhance their personal security by appealing to customary institu-
tions and to the values they embody. In everyday social practice, like in their conversations 
with their husbands, they emphasise certain values and lines of action. In the process, they 
also reproduce the masculinities that sustain a social order that is largely exclusionary for 
women.
Reflections on peacebuilding
Before the concluding section, a brief reflection on the implications of these findings for 
peacebuilding activities. A plethora of international and South Sudanese non-governmen-
tal organisations are based in Torit town, many of which run women’s rights and peace 
programmes throughout the Equatoria region. Peacebuilding activities focus on resolving 
local conflicts over land and cattle, often in the form of mediation activities, like peace 
conferences. Recognising the strength of customary institutions, NGOs bring together 
community representatives and customary leaders. The second most common activity is 
awareness-raising, which involves discussing the importance of peace in the communities. In 
both activities, women’s organisations promote women as peacemakers in the communities. 
To this end, several CBOs run training for local women peacemakers. Other organisations 
support the gender-desks in police posts to address violence against women.
While some international and all national NGOs operating in Imatong state recognised 
the strong influence of Monyomiji at the community level, they were mostly seen as an 
institution that embodies ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ that resist change, rather than as entry 
points from where change could begin. Interestingly, the senior women who sometimes 
negotiate with the Amangat and could therefore play an important role in local peace, had 
not been noted by international and national NGOs implementing peacebuilding activities. 
Working with these women, and thus recognising that hybrid governance institutions are 
strongly gendered, could offer an avenue for enhancing their negotiation capacity for every-
day peacebuilding in relation to the governance institutions that matter in everyday life.
Conclusion
This article has explained how the Equatoria region developed as a region on the ‘insurgent 
margins’. For the people of Equatoria, the way they were governed was never ‘theirs’: after 
the colonial regime the North dominated, during the second civil war it was the SPLA that 
was predominantly Dinka, and now the feeling prevails that the state continues to exclude 
Equatorians. Since the civil war ended, new forms of insecurity have spread across the 
state. As described in this article, the people have a strong sense that the state is a major 
cause of many of these conflicts, and they are left to their own devises when it comes to 
protection. The hybrid governance institutions of the Amangat and Monyomiji serve this 
purpose and are considered a highly legitimate form of governance. The masculinity of the 
Monyomiji has been constructed not only out of tradition, but also out of war, and out of 
the need to respond to persistent insecurity. What has not developed are new mechanisms 
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to keep oversight over the Monyomiji, as the old system of disciplining by the senior age 
group seems no longer effective.
The article has shown that aside from delivering security, hybrid governance institu-
tions are sites where certain norms around masculinities are reproduced. This quite clearly 
happens ‘inside’ these institutions: in this case study they were places where participating 
young men are ‘educated’ to become responsible members of their communities. It also 
happens in the social practices around these institutions: in the ways in which both men 
and women relate and engage with them, and reproduce notions of masculinity in everyday 
interactions among themselves.
In this case, hybrid security governance enjoyed popular legitimacy and were consid-
ered conducive to a locally accepted form of order from the perspective of both men and 
women.60 However, it does reproduce a gender bias and creates a situation in which women 
are still excluded from actual security, and from having voice within the institutions.61 Yet 
this article showed the complexity of exclusion, as it was not just driven by men. Women 
themselves exercised agency to influence the governance arrangements, but at the same time 
their actions and discourses contributed to reproducing masculinities and to a balance of 
power that largely excluded them.
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